
Renewing America’s economy, responding to the threat of global climate
change, and finally securing the nation’s energy independence all
compel the transformation of United States energy system. Accomplishing
this transformation requires the rapid development and deployment of a
suite of clean, affordable, and scalable energy technologies. The
challenge is this: Over the next four decades, global energy demand is
expected to triple. But at the same time, global greenhouse gas
emissions must fall rapidly, decreasing at least 50 to 85 percent by
mid-century to avert potentially catastrophic climate change.
Most of this growth in energy demand will occur in the developing world,
as nations like China, India and Brazil continue to lift their citizens
out of poverty and build modern societies. And overall, that’s a very
good thing. Increased access to energy brings relief from backbreaking
physical labor, electricity to pump and treat potable water, lights to
read and study by, a more secure built infrastructure, access to modern
health care, and much more.
The problem, however, is that fossil fuels remain cheap and abundant. In the absence of similarly affordable and scalable clean energy sources, the developing world will turn to coal and other fossil fuels to power their development, just as we in the United States did as we built our modern industrialized nation. That, of course, would virtually assure complete destabilization of the global climate system, regardless of what occurs in the developed world.
Or as President Obama’s chief science advisor John Holdren has concluded:
"Without an accelerated transition to improved technologies, societies will find it increasingly difficult – and in the end probably impossible – … to provide the affordable energy needed for sustainable prosperity everywhere without intolerably disrupting the Earth’s climate."
The
task is therefore clear: To stabilize the climate and provide the
energy necessary to sustainably power global development, we must
develop and harness a portfolio of truly scalable clean energy sources and ensure they are affordable enough to deploy throughout the world.
In short, we must make clean energy cheap.
But there's a fundamental
problem that consistently plagues this effort to make dirty energy more
expensive: policymakers and the public alike are simply reluctant to
significantly increase the cost of energy through higher prices on
carbon emissions. In today's context of deep economic recession, public
tolerance for higher energy prices is no doubt minimal, and more than a third of the U.S. Senate has yet to be convinced that the costs of cap and trade are acceptable.
The
result is this: cap and trade proposals everywhere contain one or
(usually) several mechanisms to constrain the price of carbon emissions
and contain the cost of compliance with the emissions cap. These
mechanisms come in the form of transparent "safety valves" and price
"off-ramps" or in more convoluted and obscured mechanisms like
allowance reserves, borrowing from future compliance periods (which
simply kick the can down the road), provisions allowing discretionary
suspension of the cap, or the all-too-common heavy reliance on carbon
offsets (which removes the pressure to transform capped sectors that's
the whole point of the cap while, if utilized at any meaningful scale, undermining the integrity of the entire system).
Transparent or not, these cost containment mechanisms are never absent
from cap and trade policies (at least one's that have any hope of
securing passage).
And yet, if a cap and trade program contains any of these cost containment mechanisms, it's not really a cap at all.
For
a cap and trade program to truly guarantee emissions reductions -- that
is, for it to be a true cap on emissions -- the price of carbon
emissions must be allowed to rise as high as is necessary to shift
investment decisions towards cleaner alternatives and drive emissions
reductions. That "as high as necessary" part of course runs smack dab
into the fundamental political economy of energy prices discussed
above: there's a breaking point where public tolerance for increased
energy prices simply stops. This breaking point is manifested in the
various mechanisms designed to constrain the cost of carbon, which
inevitably invalidate the certainty of the emissions cap.
And
of course, even if there are no explicit cost containment mechanisms in
a cap and trade proposal, the ballot box will act as an ultimate
constraint on the price of carbon in any democratic society. Just look
at the public backlash against higher energy prices in the summer of
2008 to see this effect in action. By the height of the gas price
spike, the "Drill Here, Drill Now!" craze was sweaping the country and
even a majority of Californians supported expanded offshore oil drilling.
This situation is even more apparent in the developing world, where tolerance of higher dirty energy prices to drive emissions reductions is virtually non-existent. This attitude is summed up succinctly in the statement of one Chinese official, Lu Xuedu, of the Office of Global Environmental Affairs. “You cannot tell people who are struggling to earn enough to eat that they need to reduce their emissions,” he told The New York Times, expressing a sentiment surely familiar to any participants in the ongoing international climate negotiations. The leaders of China, India and other developing nations have repeatedly made clear that if reducing emissions runs counter to economic development imperatives, they will not tolerate binding caps on emissions or significant carbon prices.
The ultimate effectiveness of a strategy premised
centrally on an effort to make dirty energy more expensive will always
limited by this fundamental reality of the political economy of energy
-- which we at the Breakthrough Institute have dubbed "Global Warming's Gordian Knot."
If the price of carbon must rise too high to drive emissions
reductions, various cost containment mechanisms or public backlash will
kick in -- either of which effectively abrogates the emissions cap. Yet
if we constrain the price of carbon, it will have very little impact on
emissions absent a steady supply of low-cost emissions reductions
opportunities. [Side note: this dynamic is playing out to a T in Australia right now]
Thus, to cut free of this Gordian Knot and have any hope of achieving deep, sustained emissions reductions, we need both clean and cheap energy sources that can truly replace fossil fuels to power the U.S. and global economy.
This isn't to say that pricing carbon dioxide emissions is a bad idea. Internalizing some of the many un-priced costs of burning dirty fuels is long overdue, and would clearly help send a more effective price signal to market actors. However, we must recognize that the fundamental reality of the political economy of energy will always constrain the effectiveness of a climate strategy reliant on significant increases in the price of dirty energy.
This all
brings us to the crux of the matter: if there is a limit to how far we
can get with a strategy that makes dirty energy more expensive, we need
to turn to a strategy to make clean energy cheap instead.
When I say "make clean energy cheap," I mean that in both subsidized and real terms.
First,
instead of relying on carbon prices alone to bridge the gap between the
price of fossil fuels and their cleaner alternatives, we can make clean
energy sources cost competitive by directly subsidizing their
deployment. After all, there's more than one way to make "clean,
renewable energy the profitable kind of energy," as President Obama pledged to do in his recent joint address to Congress.
While
there are several potential ways to finance these direct investments in
clean energy deployment, the most obvious and synergistic revenue
source would be a modest and politically sustainable price on carbon
(either through a straightforward carbon tax or a cap-and-auction with
cost containment provisions). Here, carbon prices still play an
important, but very different role in this strategy: they generate
critical revenues while providing some synergistic market signal to
help pull more mature and cost-competitive clean energy sources the
last few yards into the marketplace. Carbon prices are not, however,
the central driver of a clean energy transition, as envisioned in most
cap and trade proposals.
These investments in clean energy
deployment will limit the overall cost of driving clean energy into the
market compared to a strategy that relies solely on carbon prices to
drive investment decisions. Simply put, this strategy makes our carbon
dollars do double duty -- first to modestly increase the price of dirty
energy and provide increased market pull for relatively affordable
clean energy alternatives, and second as the revenue source for major
investments that directly drive down the cost of clean energy.
Perhaps more importantly though, we also need to make clean energy cheap in real, unsubsidized terms.
Permanent reliance on either major subsidy or a price on carbon will render clean energy technologies infeasible as a primary energy source for the developing world. The only way to avert disastrous global climate change is to provide clean and affordable energy sources that can meet the growing energy demands of the developing world and truly render fossil fuels obsolete.
This critical effort to make clean energy cheap, in real, unsubsidized terms, presents a massive innovation challenge.
As such, it requires a coordinated, well-funded and effective strategy
to accelerate clean energy innovation and drive major improvements in
the price and performance of clean energy technologies.
This
strategy to make clean energy cheap must support the full energy
innovation pipeline -- including (1) research and development, (2)
demonstration, and (3) early commercialization and deployment of
emerging clean energy technologies. Complementary policies supporting
critical infrastructure and human capital development (i.e. education
and training) are also requisite, but will be discussed elsewhere.
A
strategy to make clean energy cheap begins with a dramatic increase in
energy R&D investments -- on the scale of $15 billion annually in
the U.S. and much more globally -- aimed at creating a new generation
of affordable clean energy technologies and driving major cost
reductions in existing technologies through breakthroughs in materials,
production methods and more. As Energy Secretary Steven Chu recently told the U.S. Senate,
new, low-cost solar panel materials, electric vehicle batteries with
greatly increased energy storage and weight characteristics, and
next-generation biofuel production methods are all likely candidates
for major R&D breakthroughs.
To take technologies from
the lab to the marketplace, this strategy must also support the
commercial-scale demonstration of first-of-its-kind technologies.
Public investments on the scale of $5 billion annually could, when
combined with private sector investment, accelerate the critical but
high-risk demonstration of a whole portfolio of new technologies --
including next-generation nuclear reactors, carbon capture and storage
technologies, floating deep water offshore wind turbine designs, new
wave and tidal power technologies, cellulosic ethanol production
methods and advanced/engineered geothermal energy techniques.
And
since carbon prices alone cannot pull more costly emerging clean energy
sources into the marketplace, a strategy to make clean energy cheap
must also include major direct investments to drive the deployment of
emerging clean energy technologies. We should commit roughly $30
billion annually to directly buy down the cost of clean energy
technologies in the early stages of commercialization.
Emerging
technologies routinely experience robust economies of scale and
learning curves with increased manufacturing capacity and deployment
that result in direct cost-reductions. For example, numerous studies
have shown that the production cost of solar photovoltaic modules have
reliably decreased by approximately 20 percent with every doubling of
cumulative installed capacity.
The primary focus of this
clean energy deployment strategy should therefore be to drive down real
production costs by providing increased and consistent demand for
early-stage clean energy technologies that accelerate economies of
scale and learning curves. By creating larger and more consistent
market demand, these public investments would also attract greater
private investment in the development of these technologies.
Wind
power, concentrating solar thermal power plants, and current solar
photovoltaic technologies are all candidates for major direct public
investment that can drive these technologies to scale and capture
associated cost reductions. And as more technologies emerge from the
earlier stages of the energy innovation pipeline discussed above, they
will quickly be picked up and driven into the market by this direct
deployment strategy
Since real cost reductions are the primary objective, continued public investments in any emerging technology should be predicated upon the achievement of consistent improvement in price and performance. In this manner, this strategy to drive clean energy deployment will not select winners and losers a priori, nor will it create permanently subsidized industries. These public investments will instead provide opportunity for all emerging, low-carbon energy technologies to demonstrate progress toward competitive costs while increasing the rate at which early-stage clean, and affordable energy technologies are commercialized.
Taken
together, these investments in R&D, demonstration and deployment --
totalling roughly $50 billion annually -- can dramatically accelerate
the transition to a clean energy economy, drive down the real price of
clean energy technologies, and ensure the supply of a whole portfolio
of clean and truly affordable energy sources that can power sustainable
development globally. Compared to the estimated costs of an effective
cap and trade program (which could rise to well above $100 billion
annually), these investments to make clean energy cheap are a bargain.
And unlike a strategy that requires major increases in the price of
dirty energy, a strategy to make clean energy cheap can actually
succeed within the realities of the political economy of energy.
Jesse Jenkins is the Director of Energy and Climate Policy at the Breakthrough Institute. He is also the founder and chief editor of WattHead - Energy News and Commentary and a Featured Blogger and Editorial Board Member at The Energy Collective
[Note
from the author: I strongly encourage you to share thoughts, reactions,
criticisms or anything else on the above analysis and proposed strategy
to make clean energy cheap in the comments section or in your own posts
at The Energy Collective.]



















earthling09 said:
We want and need big businesses to supply products and services. We just do not want big business to interfere with our government, run roughshod over our people or wreak havoc in our natural environment.
Use small scale mass customization using the best combination of sustainable energy generating capacity for individual buildings. Conservation, solar, wind, hydro-electric, tidal and geothermal are a few options for extracting energy for individual buildings, small factories or farms. Nuclear power can be used for large industrial purposes. Use batteries and capacitors to improve the reliability of the energy.
Replace the culture of dependence being sold by these giant energy extraction and utility companies, with a new age of personal responsibility and creative freedom. Responsibility and freedom are the same thing. We can and we are taking responsibility for supplying our energy away from these unreliable energy supply corporations. Its the grid that is unreliable.
Lets get busy and design and build a replacement for the unreliable energy extraction industry and utility grid that has just about destroyed the world economy. Well, I guess the energy industry is the foundation of the world economy, isn't it? No, agriculture is the foundation, but energy is definitely a vital aspect of our economy.
Small scale mass customization, is the solution for solving these disruptive fluctuations in our power supply, its just a matter of engineering.
- reply
- 0 points
Mon, 2009-04-06 04:53 — earthling09RodAdams said:
- reply
- 0 points
Sat, 2009-03-28 08:24 — Rod AdamsCharlesBarton said:
- reply
- 0 points
Fri, 2009-03-27 20:36 — Charles BartonJohnDroz said:
- reply
- 0 points
Fri, 2009-03-27 20:26 — John DrozJesseJenkins said:
Jesse
- reply
- 0 points
Fri, 2009-03-27 20:12 — Jesse JenkinsJesseJenkins said:
- reply
- 0 points
Fri, 2009-03-27 20:05 — Jesse JenkinsJohnDroz said:
- reply
- 0 points
Fri, 2009-03-27 19:34 — John DrozJesseJenkins said:
- reply
- 0 points
Fri, 2009-03-27 19:27 — Jesse JenkinsJesseJenkins said:
- reply
- 0 points
Fri, 2009-03-27 19:15 — Jesse JenkinsJesseJenkins said:
- reply
- 0 points
Fri, 2009-03-27 19:10 — Jesse JenkinsJohnDroz said:
- reply
- 0 points
Fri, 2009-03-27 18:54 — John DrozMarkLazen said:
Jesse puts his money where his mouth is. He works tirelessly for balanced and practical solutions and is eager to find paths to productive compromise with people from all sides of this debate.
I encourage you to offer up substantive counterpoint. "Damn these kids" just isn't very constructive.
- reply
- 0 points
Fri, 2009-03-27 18:05 — MarkLazenJohnDroz said:
- reply
- 0 points
Fri, 2009-03-27 16:54 — John DrozJesseJenkins said:
Jesse Jenkins
- reply
- 0 points
Fri, 2009-03-27 14:29 — Jesse JenkinsJohnDroz said:
- reply
- 0 points
Fri, 2009-03-27 14:17 — John Drozearthling09 said:
I am opposed to using agricultural products for producing energy, because it is unnecessary and it disrupts the economy of food production.
On the supply side, I would focus our efforts on the housing industry in particular and the building industry in general. The technology is readily available to construct smart buildings that use far less energy than current construction industry standards. We should use government regulatory policy to nudge our economy toward a more sustainable construction industry technology.
The natural universe is made out of energy, there is no shortage of energy. We can and should develop the means (antennas) for individual buildings to tap into the universal energy. Solar, wind, hyrdroelectric, tidal, geothermal are just a few obvious examples of ways that we can tap into the universal energy. We can do this on a small scale. The buildings themselves will have the technology to tap into the energy around them, built in to them. And if consumers need or want to increase their energy use they can go to Ace hardware or Home Depot and buy another antenna to draw more energy.
I would use the power of government, both taxes and regulations, to lead our economy in this direction. I would definitely invest government spending on research in this area. Another idea I've considered, I'm not sure how smart it is, is to eliminate corporate income taxes. No tax, no representation. That way we can get back to government of the people, by the people and for the people. That's a big complicated deal, a whole other topic. We'd have to defend against people hiding personal income as corporate income.
Another aspect of the comprehensive energy policy is to develop electric drive automobiles. The technology already exists to build electric drive vehicles, we should use all available means to get this done as soon as possible.
The main problem is that stock holders of energy companies are the same people who own the housing industry and the automobile industry, and they are resisting the obsolescence of the internal combustion engine that is so central to our economy. Electric motors can do anything an internal combustion engine can do. Hydrocarbons will be used in our chemical industry, rather than our energy industry.
I'm not sure about how to get all this done. I do believe the government should be actively and aggressively executing policies to lead our economy toward this cleaner technology, as well as our independence from these giant utility companies. I am not opposed to big business, I am opposed to the culture of dependence we have developed in our economy.
One last thing. I suspect that we are in for an environmental catastrophe no matter what we do. We have already injected enough pollution into our environment. We are already beginning to experience a significant change in earth's climate. These changes will continue to accelerate and will likely result in some drastic and very rapid changes to earth's biosphere.
We are all responsible and accountable for transforming our economy as rapidly as possible. I like our machines, they are our servants. We need big business to produce the machines. We just want, and need, our machines to be clean, and to be as harmless as possible.
- reply
- 0 points
Thu, 2009-03-26 14:27 — earthling09Dan Yurman said:
In prior coverage of the battle between coal and nuclear as fuel sources, I have focused on TVA which is at the heart of the history of government initiatives to deploy energy technologies for the benefit of a large geographic region. TVA's role was to make energy available for a region that was poverty stricken and it succeeded. It demonstrated the truism that not all energy supplies can or should be justified solely by market mechanisms.
This is the battle that is shaping up in the pending decision whether to restart construction of two older units at Bellefonte, build two new units, or develop all four reactors. The focus of the battle will be whether the Obama administration and Congress will authorize TVA to raise its debt limit.
Loan guarantees for new nuclear power plants, which will reduce the nation's green house gas emissions, are a similar example. The principle is that there are some thing government must do, and one of them is to intervene when market mechanisms fail and when the well being of society hangs in the balance. The success of this strategy is demonstated by the eight month payback of the costs of restarting the Browns Ferry nuclear plant.
I think that if you start from that principle, you will see that the role of nuclear and "renewable energies" are mutually supported by this principle, albiet with different outcomes in mind. Nuclear is a base load energy source. Solar and wind by theitr nature, are variable and can only be considered to be peak or supplemental to base load. The common factor is that both need transmission and distribtuion lines to get electricity to rate payers - customers. Base load source keep the T&D networks open, which are basically toll collecting turnpikes for electricty. With enough addtiional capacity, the same networks can deliver solar and wind generated electricity.
It is not just the cost of gernerating the electricity that matters, e.g., per Kw/Hr, it is also the cost of getting the electrciity to users and the role of government in setting the rates to be charged for both costs.
- reply
- 0 points
Thu, 2009-03-26 06:18 — Dan YurmanJesseJenkins said:
You wrote: "Early adoption is not a useful model for energy technologies..."
That's exactly my point. There are no early adopters here, as their are for discretionary consumer goods because (a) energy is not really that discretionary and (b) energy is an undifferentiated commodity, so there's nothing on the consumer end to distinguish between electrons from a new or old energy tech, other than cost. Hence the need to help support emerging technologies as they reach scale. Without early adopters, public investment is the only way to get these technologies into the game and give them any chance of competing with well-entrenched incumbent technologies.
You wrote: "the difference is that light water reactors are proven technologies with more than 400 operational world wide"
Yes, but how did the light water reactor designs get demonstrated in the first place? Through significant government intervention, right? The whole technology comes out of defense-funded nuclear weapons development and then the government-funded Atoms for Peace initiative. I assume first commercial demonstrations has considerable government backing and public investment, eh? And nuclear is the only major energy source commercialized and deployed at any scale in the latter half of the 20th century. While not everything with nuclear's genesis is worth repeating, it IS worth noting that w/out the kind of support and public investment I call for above, nuclear wouldn't be here today as a commercial energy source. Same could be expected for other emerging technologies today, right?
You wrote: "The drive to reduce the cost per Kw/Hr for solar and wind is fueled by state laws that mandate utilities buy prescribed percentages of "renewable power.""
Well, having worked to pass two statewide RPS policies, I can say that they are NOT in fact designed to help emerging technologies develop and cut costs. RPS policies are designed to achieve a certain percentage of electricity generation from qualifying technologies at the lowest cost to ratepayers. They therefore encourage deployment of the lowest-cost renewable energy technology available – generally wind power – while doing little to drive down the price of other, higher-cost clean energy technologies. If we want a full portfolio of several affordable and scalable clean energy sources suitable to power the global economy, we need a deployment strategy explicitly designed to help accelerate the rate of energy innovation and drive emerging technologies to scale, capturing cost reductions. We've got to pick up each emerging technology wherever they are in terms of cost and scale and move them forward until we can see if they have potential to sustain cost reductions and drive costs down towards competing fossil energy sources.
In short, the single greatest obstacle to the widespread deployment of low-carbon energy technologies is their currently high cost relative to conventional energy technologies. Yet the policies typically employed to speed the deployment of these technologies, including RPS policies, are not explicitly designed to drive cost reductions, limiting their ability to accelerate the transition to a low-carbon economy. A new deployment strategy is therefore necessary that is specifically designed to make clean energy cheap...
Cheers,
Jesse
- reply
- 0 points
Wed, 2009-03-25 22:20 — Jesse JenkinsDan Yurman said:
Well you are absolutely right about the nuclear angle. Loan guarantees are essential for the industry to gain access to capital. However, the difference is that light water reactors are proven technologies with more than 400 operational world wide and all in revenue service providing electricity to meet base load demand.
Early adoption is not a useful model for energy technologies since this marketing paradigm is usually applied to discretionary consumer goods, e.g., home electronics and recreational vehicles.
Otherwise, your criteria are pretty good except the last one. It is always difficult to "prove" the potential for market penetration. That rate is usually set, in terms of the pace of replacement of fully depreciated assets. As long as coal fired plants can serve as relaible cash cows, they will not be replaced by "green" technologies including new nuclear plants.
Carbon taxes will likely encounter heavy political seas on Congress, and may be seen more as a new tax and as a source of revenue than as a means to cut down on the growth of green house gas emissions.
The energy industry is littered with the corpses of new technologies which met all of your criteria, but which failed to attract investors because of the safe rate of return associated with the installed base of current technologies.
The drive to reduce the cost per Kw/Hr for solar and wind is fueled by state laws that mandate utilities buy prescribed percentages of "renewable power." If PUCs and state legislatures didn't impose these requirements on utilities, and related T&D networks, the outlook for achieving cost competitiveness would be grim. Every energy technology has some kind of subsidy. The only question is whether any of them will make energy cheaper and cleaner for consumers and the planet.
- reply
- 0 points
Wed, 2009-03-25 22:01 — Dan YurmanJesseJenkins said:
However, the energy sector is capital intensive, it's full of well-entrenched technologies that have benefited from decades of infrastructure development and plenty of their own public subsidy. Furthermore, there is little in the way of an "early adopter" market in the energy sector, nobody willing to pay 2-5x more for the latest greatest gadget or most cutting edge treatment as their is in IT, biotech and other high-tech fields. Finally, most emerging technologies emerge with much higher costs than their incumbent competitors, while they often achieve significant price reductions as they are deployed at scale.
All that means we can't expect emerging energy technologies to compete off the bat with well-entrenched imcumbents. Yet that also means these techs are unlikely to be deployed at scales that drive major price reductions and help them close the price gap between new clean energy sources and incumbent dirty energy technologies. Hence the need for major direct public investments in the early-stage deployment of these technologies (which is distinct from supporting first-of-its-kind commercial demonstration, which I also call for). I would propose structuring this deployment strategy as follows:
Incentive would be aimed at low-carbon technologies that at minimum satisfy the following criteria:
• Technology has demonstrated technical feasibility at a scale that can be offered by commercial vendors of the technology (i.e. has been demonstrated at commercial scale);
• Technology is currently priced at above-market rates (i.e. higher than incumbent market competitors);
• Technology has technical potential for significant and rapid cost-reductions during deployment;
• Technology has strong prospects for long-term market penetration once deployment subsidies end.
Over time, continued public investments in selected technologies should be predicated upon the achievement of specified cost-reductions. For example, if a technology does not experience cost reductions on, say, a multi-year rolling average basis that are within a range of expected cost reductions due to learning curves and economies of scale, then public investments in the technology should be terminated. Likewise, if a technology reaches installed costs that are competitive with market rates or are low enough for conventional policy mechanisms like renewable portfolio standards to pull them into the market, ongoing public investments would no longer be needed.
Does that make sense Dan? As a nuclear proponent, I'd think you'd understand and resonate with the need for major public support for the deployment of emerging technologies. After all, without major subsidy in the form of loan guarantees, insurance indeminfication and even production incentives, the nuclear energy industry would not have gotten off to a start in the first place, nor is it likely to experience much of a resurgence today, right? Cheers,
Jesse
- reply
- 0 points
Wed, 2009-03-25 16:33 — Jesse JenkinsDan Yurman said:
There are a couple of items that could be added here. The first is this strategy addresses only cost competitiveness, but it misses two other elements, which are ROI based on technology differentiation, and the predictable rate at which new energy technologies are likely to replace old ones given the continued profitability of fully depreciated assets.
It needs to consider the time it takes for fuel types to be replaced in terms of technology diffusion. Looking at the transitions in US industrialization from wood, to coal, to oil, and then gas, each transition involved massive investments in manufacturing capabilities, infrastructure, and replacement of previous infrastructure.
For instance, for surface transportation, trains ran on wood, then coal, and finally fuel oil. Huge amounts of capital had to be committed to each transition, which only occured when firms were able to calculate ROI for the change. For instance, the diesel locomotive had a competitive advantage over steam because offered lower maintenance, lower labor costs ( dummy units could be slaved to a single head engine and one engineer), greater range and more power. Even so it took nearly 30 years for the transition to occur.
Similar challenges confront green technologies for industrial energy use, e.g., electricity generation for households, and factories, because of the dead weight of fully depreciated power generation assets that still work, and for which there is no compelling competitive reason to swap them out for new technologies. This is why the coal fired utilities are fighting the rise of nuclear energy. Investors have wonderful cash cows they do not want to give up. The threat of global warming does not impact stockholder value, at least not yet.
Carbon cap & trade to force fuel shifting, either to nuclear or a combination of nuclear for baseload and solar/wind for variable, but not peak power, will encounter fierce opposition. However, just ask coal utilities what they think of the fact that TVA's Browns Ferry (nuclear) paid back its restoration costs in 8 months.
Huge investments in technology demonstration for "clean technologies" will not likely make a near term difference if they do not demonstrate a competitive advantage for adoption by firms and for adding to stockholder value over and above continued use of existing energy infrastructure.
In the 1970s the government heavily subsidized solar energy with tax credits, but the industry disappeared in the puff of smoke the minute the tax breaks went away. Subsidies are not the answer.
Market pull will only occur when the same type of story can be told for clean tech as was told by the diesel that sounded the death knell for steam. Value has to be measured in increased profits for firms adopting these technologies and earning a superior return, compared to other investment opportunities, for doing so.
This is why it is not easy to be green :-)
- reply
- 0 points
Mon, 2009-03-23 21:59 — Dan YurmanJesseJenkins said:
As I indicated in the post, I definitely agree that price and performance-oriented metrics should be applied to gauge any given technology's qualifications for ongoing deployment investments or subsidies.
Corn ethanol is a perfect example of a deployment subsidy clearly taken on without any clear metrics of success (its really more of an ag policy than an energy policy, as I've always maintained, and not a very good one either). Using EROI as one of those metrics is smart, because its one good measure of whether or not a technology is truly scalable enough to make an real impact on the national or global energy system.
Another good metric is any resource constraints or bottleknecks. Used fry-oil-based transportation fuels are an example of this: it's great that a few ex-hippies in Eugene, OR or garage tinkerers in Amherst, MA can run their cars on used fry oil, but there's not enough used oil in the nation to supply more than a couple hundred thousand vehicles, and there's about 350 million vehicles in the country, so it just doesn't scale to any reasonably interesting level.
The main metric though should ultimately be price. If you can't get the price down to levels that truly render coal and oil obsolete globally, we'll never get a handle on the climate crisis. And you nail the issue of comparative costs right on the head. Levelized costs per kilowatt-hour or other unit of use is a pretty good metric and comparing straight costs of capital is clearly an apples to oranges kind of comparison when it comes to wind, solar, coal, and other techs all with various capacity factors. Cheers,
Jesse
- reply
- 0 points
Mon, 2009-03-23 18:52 — Jesse JenkinsGeoffrey Styles said:
Jesse,
This is a well-thought-out analysis, and I agree wholeheartedly with the goal of making clean energy sources truly cheap. As we focus our investments (public and private) on that goal, we also need to be disciplined about de-funding options that appear to be dead ends in that regard. Energy return on energy invested (EROEI) is a useful criterion that could be applied, however much it rankles advocates of first-generation biofuels. Simply put, we're not going to make alternatives cheap by pouring money into energy sources that have a high inherent requirement for energy in their production. Whether we can get corn ethanol up from 1.4:1 to 2:1 or more becomes immaterial, if what we need is something north of at least 5:1. (Wind, solar, nuclear and all sorts of other options would pass that test.)
The other refinement I'd suggest is that we need a consistent way to compare the cost of different energy sources. Capacity costs for renewables are usually stated in terms of $/peak or nameplate Watt or MW, but the oft-expressed notion of "parity with coal" is an unhelpful illusion, when we're comparing a technology with a capacity factor of 20-35% with one that can consistently deliver 80% or higher. There are pros and cons to comparing levelized busbar costs ($/MWh generated), but it would at least give us a clearer picture of how much further costs must fall, and whether it's reasonable to think that experience-curve effects can close most of the gap.
- reply
- 0 points
Mon, 2009-03-23 18:13 — Geoffrey StylesPost new comment