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On Are Reverse Auctions the Key to Reforming Solar Energy Subsidies?

That is not the question at hand here. Please stay on topic and focused. I have no interest in yet another debate over the merits of renewables or nuclear or fossil or whatever. There are plenty of other articles on this site that raise those questions legitimately. This is not one of them, so please keep the comments on topic: are reverse auctions an improvement for solar energy support policies or not? Discuss...

August 22, 2014    View Comment    

On Will CO2 Emission Standards Spur Carbon Capture Technology?

Hi Roger,

The article does not model things at the level of engineering flows, so they only consider a varying range of costs impacts of CCS installation on the capital and O&M of coal or gas-fired plants. I believe they intended their range of sensitivities to cover amine scrubbing as well as integrated coal gasification and combined cycle (IGCC) with CCS options. 

Jesse

August 14, 2014    View Comment    

On Why Does Politics Keep Getting in the Way of Pricing Carbon? - Part 1

Hi all,

This thread, while interesting, has gotten way off topic. Let's bring it back to the questions at hand of leave this off for another day...

Jesse

August 1, 2014    View Comment    

On When Politics Constraints Carbon Pricing, Part 2: 6 Tips for Improving Climate Change Policy

Dear Peter,

You make a fair point that global climate change is of course a global phenomenon and that it must be tackled by at least a fairly substantial portion of global emitters, if not the whole world. That does raise very important challenges for coordination of policy, and yes, if any single nation acts independently, it will fail to deliver much in the way of measurable climate benefits. 

However, I have addressed this issue in my paper, and discuss it my series when considering the political economy constraints on carbon pricing in Part 1. These constraints already internalize this dynamic. That is, since nations and individuals are concerned about the "collective action" nature of climate change (see Part 1), they will discount their willingness to pay for mitigation relative to the societally optimal. That concept is a central premise of my series, and your comments have not raised any additional points that I felt needed addressed on that matter. 

Instead, I have focused on proposing a policy strategy that can succeed within the political economy constraints of each relevant national or subnational actor. If the policy framework as a whole can succeed in each nation, then it can succeed globally. In my view, climate solutions will emerge bottoms-up, nation-by-nation, not via a global top-down treaty, so I focus on the national-level policies here. You can disagree and prefer a global solution -- or a liassez-faire "free market" solution -- but that doesn't mean I need to change the entire focus of my series to accomodate your comments.

Regarding your "free market" alternative, it makes no sense to me. You talk about "removing barriers" to the free market functioning, but there is no clear evidence that the obstacle to tackling climate change is a lack of free markets. Rather, you must understand that "free markets" do nothing to consider externalities, of which climate change is the most complicated and challenging externality of modern times. You argue that regulatory barriers have prevented nuclear from scaling sufficiently by adding to its cost and regulatory risk. That may be so, but removing those barriers and shifting to a "free market" absent any regulation seems like a rather foolhardy way to handle a technology with as much inherent risk as nuclear energy (and I say that as a strong proponent of nuclear power), just as it would make little sense to have no regulations for airline safety, vehicle crash tests, or any of a wide set of regulations necessary to check the tendency of "free markets" to ignore externalized risks. Neither to a believe that "free markets" acting on their own will deliver the level and pace of technology innovation needed to develop clean energy technologies cheaper than fossil fuels. The history of government involvement in just about every substantial innovation of the last 100 years (and more) would bely that point as well. So when I stopped engaging, it was because I have no idea how your proposal would help much of anything. 

Jesse

August 1, 2014    View Comment    

On When Politics Constraints Carbon Pricing, Part 2: 6 Tips for Improving Climate Change Policy

No one has asserted that increased levels of atmospheric CO2 causes any direct respiratory harm to humans. Please stop making this point (here or on other articles). It is a complete red herring. 

August 1, 2014    View Comment    

On Can Nuclear Make a Substantial Near-Term Contribution?

Excellent analysis Schalk. This is really import stuff. In many ways you have captured THE challenge: nuclear scales an order of magnitude slower than coal. So does wind (and solar I would imagine when adjusted for capacity factor is the same). Unless that changes and one or two technologies become as scalable as coal, we clearly will need all available low carbon options--and then some!!--to displace coal in China and elsewhere. 

July 31, 2014    View Comment    

On When Politics Constraints Carbon Pricing, Part 2: 6 Tips for Improving Climate Change Policy

I captured the range of existing uncertainty in climate forecasts in the range of social cost of carbon values references, which span anywhere from $10-1000 per ton of CO2. My point in this whole series is that political constraints likely bind us before we reach anywhere too far into this range. So I actually don't see this is hinging on resolving that uncertainty. Why do you?

July 30, 2014    View Comment    

On When Politics Constraints Carbon Pricing, Part 2: 6 Tips for Improving Climate Change Policy

The wide range of uncertainty in climate damages is well known and I'm not disputing it at all. It's also embodied in the wide range of social costs of carbon discussed in my article (basically $10-1000/ton CO2, so two orders of magnitude of uncertainty there), and compounded by disagreements in the social discount rate to apply to intergenerational and global impacts. That's really not the issue of contention here. RE the rate of reduction, that was quoting from memory a presentation from Roger Pielke Jr a while back. I'd check the IPCC Working Group 1 report for a detailed discussion of net syncs, but I think that 2ppm/year figure is right +/- 20%...

July 30, 2014    View Comment    

On When Politics Constraints Carbon Pricing, Part 2: 6 Tips for Improving Climate Change Policy

The air quality benefits I was speaking of are due to reductions of pollutants that are emitted along with CO2, like particular matter, SO2, NOx, mercury, benzine etc. CO2 itself is not an air pollutant (as your brothers' greenhouse illustrates and as is well known). The harms from CO2 are associated with the greenhouse gas's impact on global average temperatures and climate patterns, as I hope the article was also obvious about.

July 30, 2014    View Comment    

On When Politics Constraints Carbon Pricing, Part 3: Why Carbon Revenues are Just as Important as "Putting a Price on Carbon"

Apropos of our discussion here: Rep. Chris Van Hollen is apparently taking another go at introducing a "cap-and-dividend" bill in the House. UMass-Amhert's James K. Boyce makes the case in the NYTimes today. 

July 30, 2014    View Comment