Mike, three points about the wind vs. nuclear buildout in China:
1. Capacity factors. Chinese capacity factors are much lower than those achieved in the US - about 26% without curtailment and about 23% with curtailment. A good breakdown is given in this TEC article. Sure, capacity factors will improve over time as towers get taller and rotor diameters get increasingly oversized, but this will be a slow process. Using data from the BP Statistical Review, it can be calculated that the global average wind capacity factor has increase marginally from 21.4% in 2000 to 23.7% in 2013. You can verify this yourself using the BP data. The US is way above the average, mainly due to the excellent wind resources in the central states, but China is pretty average. 40% is therefore not a realistic number to use for generation projections.
2. Subsidies. With enough support, deployment can evade economic realities for many years, but this usually does not end well. The great German Solar PV expansion followed by a 50% drop last year and a 40% drop so far this year is a good example. The typical boom-bust of US wind in response to the PTC is another. As stated before, China currently pays $83-100/MWh in tariffs for intermittent wind which also requires large additional investment in high voltage transmission lines - double that received by dispatchable thermal and hydro generation. Obviously, this trend is not sustainable in an economy that relies so heavily on cheap energy. As outlined in the previous TEC article I linked, cracks are already starting to appear in the support structure.
3. Nuclear scale rate. According to data provided by the World Nuclear Association, China has completed 3.2 GW of nuclear in the past year (June through June) and begun construction on 5.7 GW. In total, China now has 33 GW of nuclear under construction. Nuclear construction in China takes 4-6 years, implying that we can expect an average of 5-6 GW per year for the next couple of years - an order of magnitude slower than the coal buildout achieved in the mid 2000s when the Chinese economy was still half the size it is today, but still quite impressive. Using real-world Chinese wind capacity factors, this puts nuclear generation on a similar path to wind.
Only time will tell how long it takes for the fundamental advantages in terms of cost, dispatchability and grid connection of nuclear over wind to be reflected in the data. Naturally, the long construction times of nuclear energy has caused a delayed response to the great Chinese war on pollution declared a few years back while the modular nature of wind allowed for more rapid scaling. However, as illustrated by the bulging Chinese nuclear construction pipeline, this trend is set to change soon.
About the CCS scale rate, anyone who has studied the IEA and IPCC rapid decarbonization scenarios will know that the real CCS buildout only starts in the next decade (if the world manages to commit to the 2 deg C target in some shape or form). CCS does not have the ideological appeal necessary to win large subsidies and will have to wait until the world gets serious about climate change. Please see the second and third figures in the previous article in this series where I put the scale of the required CCS rollout in perspective using wind energy. The result really is quite striking.