Canadians learned a lot from the Conference of the Parties held in Copenhagen in December. For most people, it is clear that deep discord remains regarding the respective responsibilities of various nations, the question of whether a climate “debt” is owed to developing nations, and by what means we ensure that countries live up to their stated commitments.  These key issues were not resolved at COP-15 or at any of the previous meetings where reasonable people tried to have reasonable proposals accepted. All reports indicate that only a small number of countries were active in crafting the final deal – including the United States, China, India, Brazil and South Africa.  This reflects, in part, the nature of the critical issues that needed to be addressed.  But it also signifies the shifting geopolitical power structure.  Just as the G20 now collects together the most significant world economies, both developed and developing, there exists a virtually identical grouping of countries which account for more than 80 percent of global GHG emissions, a sort “Carbon 20” club, or “C20”, if you like.

Some are already speculating that the way the deal came together in Copenhagen signals the demise of the UNFCCC process, or at least the demise of the notion that 192 countries should have an equal say in the design of the next international climate agreement.  Similarly, the G20 was able to fashion a coordinated response to the global financial meltdown in private rooms, without the throngs of bureaucrats, researchers, consultants, NGOs and assorted protestors which caused near-chaos at times in Copenhagen.

Although the Copenhagen Accord is a minimalist deal in some eyes, there are important accomplishments: 

  • The beginning of commitments by the major developing countries.  While much attention focused on China and whether its pledge to reduce emissions intensity by 45 percent would in fact be much of a stretch, other significant goals were put on the table by Brazil, Mexico, South Korea and South Africa.
  •  Most of the funds have been committed for a prompt start of $100 billion per year over the next three years to assist developing countries with mitigation, adaptation, technology transfer and capacity building.
  • Canada will be able to define its targets in line with our economic, technological and social realities and in a way that aligns with our most important trading partner, the United States.
  •  Much attention has focused on the fact that the Accord is not legally binding, at least at this point.  But, as experience with the Kyoto Protocol has demonstrated, there is no global police force to ensure adherence other than the weight of international opinion.  More flexible arrangements to allow emerging economies to define their own contribution are an important first step.  Once inside the tent, there is a better chance that they will increase their contribution over time to what will be a decades-long global effort.

Some of the lessons learned from COP-15 include the following:

  • In one sense, COP-15 was a failure from a United Nations perspective.  Some 192 countries gathered and tried to agree to an action plan to reduce carbon emissions to the atmosphere, but the UN process produced little that could justify the huge expense of time, money and frustration.  The alternative to the large multilateral spectacle is smaller multilateral or in some cases bilateral processes that could be more effective in securing a country’s consent to reduce CO2 emissions based on its own circumstances and economic ability to do so. 
  • The top-down hard targets approach, linked to a scientific view that temperature increase should be limited to 2 degrees Celsius, turns out to be a non-starter.  The European Union (EU) was the principle proponent of the hard targets approach and here in Canada some of our provincial governments climbed on board for hard targets as well.  Recognition in the Copenhagen Accord that the temperature increase should be limited to a 2 degree Celsius rise appears to be an “aspirational” goal and may have been included to lessen the blow to the EU who saw their approach rejected.
  • The Copenhagen Accord opens the way to a more realistic discussion among a smaller number of countries on what can be achieved given the need and the will to reduce GHG emissions on one hand and the economic difficulties and consequences of ill-conceived policies to do so on the other. 
  • While not clearly stated, the Copenhagen Accord is on a Pledge and Review path.  The problem is that the world has not bought into Pledge and Review and unless some countries pick up the idea and drive it forward in the next few months, the new path may become another dead end. 

The Pledge and Review approach is encouraging news.  Over the years, climate change literature has discussed the Pledge and Review System to reduce emissions.  As I understand it, Pledge and Review is the system in which countries voluntarily pledge, implement and review domestic policies aimed at reducing GHG emissions and subject these to mutual scrutiny.  Pledge and Review is a logical path when countries want to seriously implement a flexible and diverse framework of laws and regulations to fit their own circumstances. 

 Personally, I never thought Pledge and Review would be considered, although it does make sense and is a practical way for some countries to show leadership on how they could reduce emissions without suffering as much economic harm as would be expected under a hard targets approach.  I see it as a bottom-up approach rather than the top-down approach rejected at COP-15.  To do this right, individual countries need to have a clear sense of their domestic situations (i.e. what can be reduced and by when) and have the will to devise and implement policies that bind them to action.  In Canada’s case, Pledge and Review would be a way to conciliate the diversity across the country in our regional abilities to reduce emissions. 

Pierre Guimond

President and CEO

Canadian Electricity Association